POLICY / GUIDANCE
Investment Analysis > Investment Analysis Standard Guidance > Risk Metrics for Initial Investment Analysis

Title: Risk Metrics for Initial Investment Analysis (JRC 2(a))
Type (Standard or Guideline): Standard
Approval Date: Approval July 2002

Purpose: The Standard Risk Metrics form the investment risk standards. They should be used to ensure quality and uniformity of practice, unless there is a compelling documented case to do otherwise.

Applicability: The Standard Risk Metrics are required to be used by all FAA entities and organizations pursuing an Initial Investment Decision (JRC 2(a)) for any system acquisition. For a facility acquisition, these standard metrics would need to be tailored and modified prior to beginning the risk analysis. Work continues on modifying this standard to address facility, security, and environmental issues. Accordingly, this standard should be viewed as an evolving one, and constantly updated to remain more relevant to the context and nature of all IAs. For the Initial Investment Decision, the Joint Resource Council considers the merits of all investment alternatives which meet the requirements and down-selects to the best candidate solution.

Description: The standard metrics are the risk facets of technical, operability, producibility, supportability, cost estimating, benefit estimating, schedule, management, funding, stakeholder, information security, human factors, and safety. Within each facet is a checklist of potential issues to be considered for each alternative. The number of issues identified as affecting the alternative under consideration is an indicator of magnitude of risk. This measure of risk forms the basis for the application of a methodology to assess the level, consequence, and mitigation of risk.

Content: The Standard Risk Facets, and Risk Checklist are defined and presented below.

Configuration Management: This Standard will be maintained by the Investment Analysis and Operations Research Directorate (ASD-400) in the FAA Acquisition System Toolset (FAST). It will be reviewed annually by ASD-400 for currency with acquisition environment. If any changes are necessary, they will be proposed by ASD-400 through the normal ASAG/ FAST change process.

 

Risk Metrics for Initial Investment Analysis (JRC 2a)
Terminology: Risk

Risk is defined as an event whose outcome is unknown in advance. In this context, risk implies some probability that an acquisition alternative will fail to deliver the benefits projected, either in whole or in part, and that failure may have consequences to its success. The risk can derive from uncertainties in an alternative's concept or problems encountered during design, development, implementation, or operation.

 

Risk Consideration During Initial Investment Analysis

For the Initial Investment Analysis Decision (JRC-2a), the critical issue to be answered is which of the viable acquisition alternatives is worth examining in more detail for implementation. Consequently, the risk assessment for the Initial Investment Decision is necessarily done at the macroscopic, and comprehensive levels.

The process includes

  • Identification of risk issues,
  • Development of potential mitigation strategies,
  • Assessment of investment alternatives, and
  • Affirmation of mitigation strategies to be examined for cost or benefit estimation impact.

 

The Investment Analysis Team (IAT) Alternatives Risk Assessment

In general, within the IAT Alternatives Risk Assessment there are thirteen facets that constitute an exhaustive range of potential risk areas, including: technical, operability, producibility, supportability, benefit estimate, cost estimate, schedule, management, funding, stakeholder, information security, human factors, and safety. Risk issues may be identified by discussion with program staff, users, stakeholders, or derived from secondary written sources. Usually, in the course of identifying risk issues, mitigation actions come to mind and are written down as preliminary mitigating actions. Also at this point, the discussions or secondary information suggest the likelihood of the issue surfacing and the potential severity of impact of the issue, if unmitigated.

The next step is to convene a broad team of stakeholders, programmatic, investment analysis, union representatives, and other interested colleagues. A broad team is important because information is needed from multiple perspectives. Only in so doing is it possible to get an objective assessment. Together the team reviews the material and by double blind voting and justifying discussions arrives at consensus of each facet’s rating for each alternative, and affirms or complements issue mitigation strategies or actions. In a double blind voting procedure, each group member votes before and after group discussions without knowing how other group members are voting. At the end of these discussions, the relative risk levels of alternative s emerge.

This information is provided to the IAT. In turn, the IAT uses this information and other inputs from cost, benefit, and other analyses, to put together its recommendation for down-selection.

The risk analyst then identifies whether the mitigation strategies are likely to impact the cost estimation or the benefit estimation of the down-selected alternative, and works with appropriate staff to estimate the impact within the appropriate work breakdown structure categories.

The product of this effort may be a technical memorandum, but most often is:

  • A stand-alone summary section in the Investment Analysis Report;
  • Solid input for creating cost and benefit high confidence ranges around the most likely numbers, and
  • Direct input into the Risk Management Matrix in the Initial Acquisition Program Baseline. The Risk Management Matrix may be found in the FAA Acquisition System Toolset (www.fast.faa.gov , APB Template, Section 6, Table 6.1).

Lastly, the issue ratings are summarized into a matrix for the JRC, and for continued analysis in the Solution Implementation Phase.

 

Risk Facets

The life cycle risks are broken down into thirteen components, or facets, of risk, which are used to assess the overall risk. These risk facets have been selected to reflect the comprehensive risks associated with an acquisition alternative’s development, implementation, operation, in such a way as to achieve the projected benefits. The facets are intended to facilitate the identification of risk and its quantification. The thirteen risk facets are defined as follows:

  • RiskTechnical is the risk associated with (1) developing a new or extending an existing technology to provide greater performance than previously demonstrated, or (2) achieving a level of performance. It also refers to how well the system operates to design or safety specifications.
  • RiskOperability is the risk associated with how well the system to be produced will operate within the NAS and interact with other systems. It addresses NAS or other system interfaces, the degree to which they are known and complete, and the degree to which the operational concept has been demonstrated and evolved to the point of a design baseline.
  • RiskProducibility is the risk associated with the capabilities to manufacture and produce the desired system.
  • RiskSupportability is the risk associated with fielding and maintaining the resulting systems.
  • RiskBenefit Estimate considers the difficulty in estimating the benefits and in realizing benefits. This risk facet addresses the accuracy and uncertainty of the benefit estimate, including such issues as inadequate methods to estimate the benefits, lack of data to estimate the benefits, uncertainty of assumptions, and whether the alternative is defined enough to estimate the benefits.
  • RiskCost Estimate considers the difficulty in estimating the cost and in adhering to the cost. This risk facet addresses the accuracy of the cost estimate, including such issues as inadequate methods to estimate the cost, lack of data to estimate the cost, uncertainty of assumptions, and whether the alternative is defined enough to estimate the cost.
  • RiskSchedule considers the likelihood that the alternative will be completed within the specified schedule.
  • RiskManagement refers to complexity of the alternative to manage (e.g., number of sub-tasks and/or number of performing organizations) and considers the risks of obtaining and using applicable resources and activities that may be outside of the alternative's control but can affect the alternative's outcome.
  • RiskFunding addresses the availability of funds when they are needed and a confidence in management and Congress that those funds will continue to be provided.
  • RiskStakeholder is the risk associated with various stakeholders supporting the development and operation of the alternative, such as internal FAA organizational users, Congress, airline and general Aviation users, and potential equipment and aircraft manufacturers.
  • RiskSecurity addresses a system's vulnerability to external threats and the risks likely to occur in employing countermeasures. This pertains to both information and physical issues.
  • RiskHuman Factors focuses on the effectiveness and suitability of the human-in-the-loop aspects of the system with respect to both operations and maintenance.
  • RiskSafety considers the risk associated with the performance (or lack thereof) of appropriate safety risk management activities and in implementing the identified safety requirements. This risk facet shall not be confused with the operational risk of system hazards. The operational risk of system hazards are documented in other analyses.

Risks Metrics

For the Initial Investment Analysis, measuring risk begins with the identification of the number of specific risk issues for each risk area. The identification of risks is conducted in an organized and comprehensive manner.

Risk identification involves enumerating and describing the risks pertaining to each of risk facet for successfully carrying out each of the alternatives being considered. The number of risks identified constitutes the measure, or quantification of risk. The measure of risk is not to be confused with the assessment of risk. The assessment of risk for each alternative follows a set methodology which considers the probability of occurrence of risk and the severity of impact should that risk materialize. Assessment of risk will be covered in a subsequent product of the risk standardization effort, called Risk Methodology.

For purpose of risk enumeration, Table 1: Facet Risk Checklist, is included in the following several pages. For each of the thirteen (13) risk facets already identified as being relevant to the Initial Investment Analysis Decision, a comprehensive set of risk issues are listed. The analyst should examine each alternative to determine whether each of the bulleted issues is present. The number of risk issues present and their detailed description determine the metric for risk. The risk issues that are found to be present are then the basis of further research. Further research would include a risk assessment to determine the level of risk, usually by understanding the probability of the occurrence of risk, and the severity of their impact.

 

Table 1: Facet Risk Checklist

 

Technical Risks

Operability Risks

Producibility Risks

Technology

·1 Undue reliance on currently unavailable or unproved technology

·2 Possible better new technology may be available by time alternative is implemented

System Engineering

·3 Technically incompatible with NAS Architecture

·4 Inadequate functional analysis

·5 Deficient functional allocation

·6 Incomplete integration

·7 Undefined internal interfaces

·8 Vague operational environment

·9 Insufficient requirements analysis

·10 Unstable requirements

·11 Non-compliant or unvalidated requirements

·12 Weak or non-existent failure modes analysis

·13 Requirements difficult to trace

·14 Unidentified safety/security considerations

System Design

·15 Inadequate capacity

·16 Highly complex

·17 Lack of design details

·18 Insufficient design margins

·19 Immature design

·20 Unsatisfactory growth potential

·21 Undefined physical properties

·22 Incomplete hardware design

·23 Incomplete software design

·24 Inadequate software tools

·25 Difficulty of developing real-time, safety critical software

·26 Immature software language

·27 Ineffective fault detection

·28 Inordinate use of unique resources

·29 Complex/incomplete man/machine design

·30 Undefined technical approach

System Test

·31 Inaccurate/simplistic modeling

·32 Insufficient simulation

·33 No or minimal prototype testing

·34 Incomplete/inadequate test planning

·35 Unsatisfactory OT&E results

Technical Documentation

·36 Inadequate design documentation

·37 Insufficient test documentation

·38 Ambiguous/incomplete requirements documentation

·39 Undocumented technical details

System Operation

·40 Undefined external interfaces

·41 Marginal availability

·42 Insufficient reliability

·43 Inadequate performance

·44 Unsatisfactory OT&E results

Systems Inter-operability

·45 Operationally incompatible with NAS Architecture

·46 Incompatibilities with Concept of Operations

·47 Incompatibilities with future NAS systems

·48 Places undue loads on other systems

·49 Incompatible or inconsistent operation with existing systems or regulations

·50 Unspecified operational interfaces

·51 Marginal inter-operability

Design Production

·52 Highly complex design

·53 Undeveloped production requirements

·54 Inadequate built-in test equipment

·55 Non-standard remote maintenance monitoring

·56 Novel/unproved technologies

Manufacturing

·57 Deficient manufacturing plan

·58 Novel/unproved manufacturing technologies

·59 Speculative manufacturing strategy

·60 Custom design and manufacture required

·61 Significant special tooling

·62 Undefined tooling requirements

·63 Unclear production requirements

·64 Premature initiation of manufacturing

·65 Unavailable or limited manufacturing facilities

·66 Inadequate quality assurance program

·67 Excessive standards

·68 Unavailable equipment

·69 Inexperienced contractor

·70 Inadequate configuration management process

·71 Insufficient skilled labor

·72 Shallow industrial base

Parts and Materials

·73 Undefined long lead items

·74 Unavailable government furnished equipment

·75 Ineffective incoming materials handling

·76 Unidentified hazardous materials

·77 Unavailable parts

Testing and Documentation

·78 Inadequate consideration of special test equipment

·79 Insufficient qualification testing

·80 Deficient technical data package

·81 Ineffective factory acceptance test program

·82 Untested design changes

 

Table 1: Fecet Risk Checklist, Cont’d

 

Supportability Risks

Cost Estimate Risks

Benefit Estimate Risks

Schedule Risks

O&M

·83 Inadequate O&M concept

·84 Undeveloped O&M strategy

·85 Specialized O&M equipment

·86 Insufficient maintainability

·87 Unsatisfactory maintenance interfaces

·88 Inadequate maintenance procedures

·89 Undeveloped maintenance plan

·90 Configuration management not enforced

·91 Deficient change process

·92 Logistics

·93 Insufficient spares planning

·94 Spares unavailability

·95 Inaccessible site location

·96 Inadequate training

·97 Unclear Logistics Center responsibilities

Testing and Support

·98 Insufficient support equipment

·99 COTS/NDI - Industry refresh rate not likely to be consistent with FAA needs

·100 Undeveloped support requirements

·101 Inadequate automated test equipment (ATE)

·102 Unidentified field support requirements

·103 Poor diagnostics

·104 Insufficient testing and support facilities

·105 Unskilled/insufficient manpower

Support Documentation

·106 Deficient technical data

·107 Faulty maintenance plan

·108 Undefined data rights

·109 Inappropriate release cycle

System Implementation

·110 Deficient implementation approach

·111 Uncertain transition strategy

·112 Unclear rules and procedures

·113 Insufficient personnel/staffing

·114 Unspecified/inappropriate standards

Cost Estimation

·115 Inadequate cost estimating tools

·116 Estimation errors

·117 Inaccurate discount rate

·118 Faulty BOEs**

·119 Insufficient cost margin

·120 Unrealistic overhead and G&A rates

·121 Relies on scarce resources

·122 Speculative life cycle costs

·123 Sensitivity analysis to cost drivers not undertaken

Cost Management

·124 Unsatisfactory cost controls

·125 Insufficient cost monitoring

Product Cost

·126 Undefined government furnished equipment

·127 Reliance on unavailable NDI/COTS

·128 Unavailable government facilities

·129 Unavailable contractor facilities

·130 Inadequate budget for tests

·131 Undefined hardware costs

·132 Hidden software costs

·133 Unidentified parts and materials

Benefit Identification

·134 Same benefits claimed by other programs

·135 Unidentified major benefits

·136 Unrealistic identified benefits

·137 Difficult to identify benefits

Benefit Estimation

·138 Benefits not quantifiable

·139 Difficult to estimate benefits

·140 Tenuous relationship to projected benefits

·141 External forces may affect achieving benefits

·142 Erroneous benefits estimations

·143 Inaccurate inflation/discount rates

·144 Speculative cost avoidance

·145 Faulty BOEs. Inadequate estimating tools

Schedule Estimation

·146 Inadequate schedule estimating tools

·147 Erroneous estimations

·148 Faulty BOEs

·149 Insufficient schedule margin

·150 Optimistic schedule duration

·151 Inappropriate program schedule

Schedule Dependency

·152 Unpredictable labor strikes

·153 Improper test scheduling

·154 Excessive task concurrency

·155 Unidentified need for procedures development

·156 Unidentified need for regulations development

·157 Inordinate number of critical path items

·158 Unidentified need for standards development

·159 Uncertainties in contractor process

·160 Uncertainties in contractor stability

·161 Schedule too ambitious for degree of technical complexity

·162 Unavailable materials

·163 Unavailable parts

·164 Unavailable government furnished information

·165 Unavailable facilities

·166 Unavailable personnel

·167 Unavailable tools

·168 Unavailable contractor

Schedule Management

·169 Unsatisfactory schedule controls

·170 Insufficient program schedule monitoring

·171 Improper contractor/subcontractor schedule monitoring

Table 1: Facet Risk Checklist, Cont’d

 

Management Risks

Funding Risks

Stakeholder Risks

Planning

·172 Inadequate program plans

·173 Incomplete contingency plans

·174 Deficient risk management plans

·175 Inadequate management approach

·176 Unplanned slips in other programs

·177 Adverse environmental impacts

·178 Unsubstantiated funding profile

·179 Unsubstantiated manpower requirements

·180 Unidentified personnel skills

·181 Minimal resource alternatives

·182 Excessive dependencies on other system

·183 Unexpected acquisition regulation changes

Organizing

·184 Excessive span of control

·185 Inadequate authority

·186 Undefined responsibilities

·187 Unclear communications

·188 Undefined integration responsibilities

·189 Ambiguous organizational interfaces

·190 Inadequate contractor organization

Implementing

·191 Insufficient management tools

·192 Inadequate program office staffing

·193 Inadequate resource allocation

·194 Deficient personnel management

·195 Lack of coordination

·196 Tenuous top management support

·197 Cumbersome FAA contracting process

·198 Instability of contractor

·199 Uncertainties in procurement

·200 Unavailable personnel

·201 Deficient change implementation

Control

·202 Undefined or ineffective change management

·203 Unsatisfactory configuration management

·204 Insufficient contract evaluation

·205 Inadequate planning for contractor monitoring

·206 Insufficient financial management

·207 Irregular/unscheduled program reviews

·208 Insufficient history/records

·209 Undefined key metrics

·210 Uncontrolled requirements changes

·211 Requirements freeze not enforced

·212 Inadequate tracking systems

Funding Constraint

·213 Unfavorable agency priorities

·214 Inadequate funding

·215 Unavailable funding

·216 Lengthy budget cycle

·217 Inadequate OMB marks

·218 Constraining unique budget scoring rules for lease-purchases and leases per OMB A-11

Funding Support

·219 Inadequate user support

·220 Ambiguous operator support

·221 Unclear political support

·222 Marginal cost/benefits

·223 Inconsistent FAA plans

·224 Lack of alignment of necessary funding profile with agency affordability profile

Fiscal Management

·225 Insufficient funding requirements

·226 Insufficient fiscal controls

·227 Insufficient fiscal tools

·228 Insufficient funding plans

 

 

 

 

 

 

Congressional Based

·229 Impact of congressional mandates

·230 Unfavorable congressional hearings on program

·231 Critical GAO report

Administration Based

·232 Conflicting FAA priorities

·233 Conflicting DOT priorities

Aviation Community

·234 Many different stakeholders

·235 Diverse user community

·236 Conflicting user demands

·237 Conflicting user opinions

·238 Conflicting user priorities

·239 Inordinate pressure from user groups

·240 Marginal user support

·241 Strained relationships with users

·242 Resistance to avionics equipage requirements

·243 Inordinate media attention

Table 1: Facet Risk Checklist, Cont’d

Security Risks

Human Factors Risks

Safety Risks

Vulnerability

·244 Incomplete vulnerability assessment

·245 Security policy and procedures not in place

·246 Easy access to communication

·247 No provision for firewalls between shared networks or Virtual Private Networks

Threat

·248 Incomplete threat assessment on intent and capability to exploit vulnerability

·249 No prioritization of threat severity

·250 No provision for penetration testing

·251 Threat difficulty not considered

Countermeasures

·252 Few countermeasures defined

·253 Effectiveness of countermeasures on infrastructure not testing

·254 Inadequate configuration audit

·255 Lack of monitoring and enforcement

·256 Insufficient funding tools/controls

·257 Ambiguous funding support

Human-in-the-loop Effectiveness

·258 Inadequate definition of human-in-the-loop operational objectives

·259 Inadequate specification of human-in-the-loop benefits

·260 Inadequate analysis of human-in-the-loop system capability to deliver expected benefits or enhancement

·261 Human error mechanisms or metrics not fully identified

·262 Time required to perform tasks is unknown

·263 Automation does not provide the necessary functionality or information to support effective decision-making/problem-solving

Human-in-the-loop Suitability

·264 Lack of consistency, compatibility, or congruity with operational environment or legacy systems

·265 Human-system design/interface induces new/additional human error potential

·266 Inadequate incorporation of functional requirements to support user-system performance goals

User Acceptability

·267 New tasks impose excessive attention, memory, or workload demands

·268 Requires new teaming and communication links

·269 Operations interface is unacceptable to user

·270 Maintenance interface is unacceptable to user

Hazards

·271 Hazards and service-level effects not fully identified

·272 Inter-relationship of hazard effects not established

·273 Hazards not classified per common scheme

·274 Hazard class not based on operational environment definition

System Safety Interdependence

·275 Hazard interdependence poorly understood

·276 Interoperability of components on system safety not investigated

·277 Systemic approach to safety is lacking one or more components (planning, requirements, procedures, operation, aircraft certification, or user approval)

Mitigation Strategies

·278 Mitigation strategies not shared

·279 Operational and safety objective not established

·280 Lack of critical/valid safety information

·281 Mitigation strategies not tied to hazards or safety requirements

·282 Plan for development and operational assurance not in place