Investment Analysis > Investment Analysis Standard Guidance > Risk Metrics for Initial Investment Analysis
Title:
Risk Metrics for Initial Investment Analysis (JRC 2(a))
Type (Standard or Guideline):
Standard
Approval Date:
Approval July 2002
Purpose:
The Standard Risk Metrics form the investment risk standards. They should be used to ensure quality and uniformity of practice, unless there is a compelling documented case to do otherwise.
Applicability:
The Standard Risk Metrics are required to be used by all FAA entities and organizations pursuing an Initial Investment Decision
(JRC 2(a)) for any system acquisition. For a facility acquisition, these standard metrics would need to be tailored and modified prior to beginning the risk analysis. Work continues on modifying this standard to address facility, security, and environmental issues. Accordingly, this standard should be viewed as an evolving one, and constantly updated to remain more relevant to the context and nature of all
IAs. For the Initial Investment Decision, the Joint Resource Council considers the merits of all investment alternatives which meet the requirements and down-selects to the best candidate solution.
Description:
The standard metrics are the risk facets of technical, operability,
producibility, supportability, cost estimating, benefit estimating, schedule, management, funding, stakeholder, information security, human factors, and safety. Within each facet is a checklist of potential issues to be considered for each alternative. The number of issues identified as affecting the alternative under consideration is an indicator of magnitude of risk. This measure of risk forms the basis for the application of a methodology to assess the level, consequence, and mitigation of risk.
Content:
The Standard Risk Facets, and Risk Checklist are defined and presented below.
Configuration Management:
This Standard will be maintained by the Investment Analysis and Operations Research Directorate (ASD-400) in the FAA Acquisition System Toolset (FAST). It will be reviewed annually by ASD-400 for currency with acquisition environment. If any changes are necessary, they will be proposed by
ASD-400 through the normal ASAG/ FAST change process.
Risk Metrics for Initial Investment Analysis
(JRC 2a)
Terminology: Risk
Risk
is defined as an event whose outcome is unknown in advance. In this context, risk implies some probability that an acquisition alternative will fail to deliver the benefits projected, either in whole or in part, and that failure may have consequences to its success. The risk can derive from uncertainties in an alternative's concept or problems encountered during design, development, implementation, or operation.
Risk Consideration During Initial Investment Analysis
For the Initial Investment Analysis Decision (JRC-2a), the critical issue to be answered is which of the viable acquisition alternatives is worth examining in more detail for implementation. Consequently, the risk assessment for the Initial Investment Decision is necessarily done at the macroscopic, and comprehensive levels.
The process includes
-
Identification of risk issues,
-
Development of potential mitigation strategies,
-
Assessment of investment alternatives, and
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Affirmation of mitigation strategies to be examined for cost or benefit estimation impact.
The Investment Analysis Team
(IAT) Alternatives Risk Assessment
In general, within the IAT Alternatives Risk Assessment there are thirteen facets that constitute an exhaustive range of potential risk areas, including: technical, operability,
producibility, supportability, benefit estimate, cost estimate, schedule, management, funding, stakeholder, information security, human factors, and safety. Risk issues may be identified by discussion with program staff, users, stakeholders, or derived from secondary written sources. Usually, in the course of identifying risk issues, mitigation actions come to mind and are written down as preliminary mitigating actions. Also at this point, the discussions or secondary information suggest the likelihood of the issue surfacing and the potential severity of impact of the issue, if unmitigated.
The next step is to convene a broad team of stakeholders, programmatic, investment analysis, union representatives, and other interested colleagues. A broad team is important because information is needed from multiple perspectives. Only in so doing is it possible to get an objective assessment. Together the team reviews the material and by double blind voting and justifying discussions arrives at consensus of each facet’s rating for each alternative, and affirms or complements issue mitigation strategies or actions. In a double blind voting procedure, each group member votes before and after group discussions without knowing how other group members are voting. At the end of these discussions, the relative risk levels of alternative s emerge.
This information is provided to the IAT. In turn, the IAT uses this information and other inputs from cost, benefit, and other analyses, to put together its recommendation for down-selection.
The risk analyst then identifies whether the mitigation strategies are likely to impact the cost estimation or the benefit estimation of the down-selected alternative, and works with appropriate staff to estimate the impact within the appropriate work breakdown structure categories.
The product of this effort may be a technical memorandum, but most often is:
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A stand-alone summary section in the Investment Analysis Report;
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Solid input for creating cost and benefit high confidence ranges around the most likely numbers, and
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Direct input into the Risk Management Matrix in the Initial Acquisition Program Baseline. The Risk Management Matrix may be found in the FAA Acquisition System Toolset
(www.fast.faa.gov , APB Template, Section 6, Table 6.1).
Lastly, the issue ratings are summarized into a matrix for the JRC, and for continued analysis in the Solution Implementation Phase.
Risk Facets
The life cycle risks are broken down into thirteen components, or facets, of risk, which are used to assess the overall risk. These risk facets have been selected to reflect the comprehensive risks associated with an acquisition alternative’s development, implementation, operation, in such a way as to achieve the projected benefits. The facets are intended to facilitate the identification of risk and its quantification. The thirteen risk facets are defined as
follows:
is the risk associated with (1) developing a new or extending an existing technology to provide greater performance than previously demonstrated, or (2) achieving a level of performance. It also refers to how well the system operates to design or safety specifications.
RiskOperability
is the risk associated with how well the system to be produced will operate within the NAS and interact with other systems. It addresses NAS or other system interfaces, the degree to which they are known and complete, and the degree to which the operational concept has been demonstrated and evolved to the point of a design baseline.
RiskProducibility
is the risk associated with the capabilities to manufacture and produce the desired system.
RiskSupportability
is the risk associated with fielding and maintaining the resulting systems.
RiskBenefit Estimate
considers the difficulty in estimating the benefits and in realizing benefits. This risk facet addresses the accuracy and uncertainty of the benefit estimate, including such issues as inadequate methods to estimate the benefits, lack of data to estimate the benefits, uncertainty of assumptions, and whether the alternative is defined enough to estimate the benefits.
RiskCost Estimate
considers the difficulty in estimating the cost and in adhering to the cost. This risk facet addresses the accuracy of the cost estimate, including such issues as inadequate methods to estimate the cost, lack of data to estimate the cost, uncertainty of assumptions, and whether the alternative is defined enough to estimate the cost.
RiskSchedule
considers the likelihood that the alternative will be completed within the specified schedule.
RiskManagement
refers to complexity of the alternative to manage (e.g., number of sub-tasks and/or number of performing organizations) and considers the risks of obtaining and using applicable resources and activities that may be outside of the alternative's control but can affect the alternative's outcome.
RiskFunding
addresses the availability of funds when they are needed and a confidence in management and Congress that those funds will continue to be provided.
RiskStakeholder
is the risk associated with various stakeholders supporting the development and operation of the alternative, such as internal FAA organizational users, Congress, airline and general Aviation users, and potential equipment and aircraft manufacturers.
RiskSecurity
addresses a system's vulnerability to external threats and the risks likely to occur in employing countermeasures. This pertains to both information and physical issues.
RiskHuman Factors
focuses on the effectiveness and suitability of the human-in-the-loop aspects of the system with respect to both operations and maintenance.
RiskSafety
considers the risk associated with the performance (or lack thereof) of appropriate safety risk management activities and in implementing the identified safety requirements. This risk facet shall not be confused with the operational risk of system hazards. The operational risk of system hazards are documented in other analyses.
Risks Metrics
For the Initial Investment Analysis, measuring risk begins with the identification of the number of specific risk issues for each risk area. The identification of risks is conducted in an organized and comprehensive manner.
Risk identification involves enumerating and describing the risks pertaining to each of risk facet for successfully carrying out each of the alternatives being considered. The number of risks identified constitutes the measure, or quantification of risk. The measure of risk is not to be confused with the assessment of risk. The assessment of risk for each alternative follows a set methodology which considers the probability of occurrence of risk and the severity of impact should that risk materialize. Assessment of risk will be covered in a subsequent product of the risk standardization effort, called Risk Methodology.
For purpose of risk enumeration, Table 1: Facet Risk Checklist, is included in the following several pages. For each of the thirteen (13) risk facets already identified as being relevant to the Initial Investment Analysis Decision, a comprehensive set of risk issues are listed. The analyst should examine each alternative to determine whether each of the bulleted issues is present. The number of risk issues present and their detailed description determine the metric for risk. The risk issues that are found to be present are then the basis of further research. Further research would include a risk assessment to determine the level of risk, usually by understanding the probability of the occurrence of risk, and the severity of their impact.
Table 1: Facet Risk Checklist
Technical Risks
|
Operability Risks |
Producibility Risks
|
Technology
·1
Undue reliance on currently unavailable or unproved technology
·2
Possible better new technology may be available by time alternative is implemented
System Engineering
·3
Technically incompatible with NAS Architecture
·4
Inadequate functional analysis
·5
Deficient functional allocation
·6
Incomplete integration
·7
Undefined internal interfaces
·8
Vague operational environment
·9
Insufficient requirements analysis
·10
Unstable requirements
·11
Non-compliant or unvalidated requirements
·12
Weak or non-existent failure modes analysis
·13
Requirements difficult to trace
·14
Unidentified safety/security considerations
System Design
·15
Inadequate capacity
·16
Highly complex
·17
Lack of design details
·18
Insufficient design margins
·19
Immature design
·20
Unsatisfactory growth potential
·21
Undefined physical properties
·22
Incomplete hardware design
·23
Incomplete software design
·24
Inadequate software tools
·25
Difficulty of developing real-time, safety critical software
·26
Immature software language
·27
Ineffective fault detection
·28
Inordinate use of unique resources
·29
Complex/incomplete man/machine design
·30
Undefined technical approach
System Test
·31
Inaccurate/simplistic modeling
·32
Insufficient simulation
·33
No or minimal prototype testing
·34
Incomplete/inadequate test planning
·35
Unsatisfactory OT&E results
Technical Documentation
·36
Inadequate design documentation
·37
Insufficient test documentation
·38
Ambiguous/incomplete requirements documentation
·39
Undocumented technical details
|
System Operation
·40
Undefined external interfaces
·41
Marginal availability
·42
Insufficient reliability
·43
Inadequate performance
·44
Unsatisfactory OT&E results
Systems Inter-operability
·45
Operationally incompatible with NAS Architecture
·46
Incompatibilities with Concept of Operations
·47
Incompatibilities with future NAS systems
·48
Places undue loads on other systems
·49
Incompatible or inconsistent operation with existing systems or regulations
·50
Unspecified operational interfaces
·51
Marginal inter-operability |
Design Production
·52
Highly complex design
·53
Undeveloped production requirements
·54
Inadequate built-in test equipment
·55
Non-standard remote maintenance monitoring
·56
Novel/unproved technologies
Manufacturing
·57
Deficient manufacturing plan
·58
Novel/unproved manufacturing technologies
·59
Speculative manufacturing strategy
·60
Custom design and manufacture required
·61
Significant special tooling
·62
Undefined tooling requirements
·63
Unclear production requirements
·64
Premature initiation of manufacturing
·65
Unavailable or limited manufacturing facilities
·66
Inadequate quality assurance program
·67
Excessive standards
·68
Unavailable equipment
·69
Inexperienced contractor
·70
Inadequate configuration management process
·71
Insufficient skilled labor
·72
Shallow industrial base
Parts and Materials
·73
Undefined long lead items
·74
Unavailable government furnished equipment
·75
Ineffective incoming materials handling
·76
Unidentified hazardous materials
·77
Unavailable parts
Testing and Documentation
·78
Inadequate consideration of special test equipment
·79
Insufficient qualification testing
·80
Deficient technical data package
·81
Ineffective factory acceptance test program
·82
Untested design changes
|
Table 1: Fecet Risk Checklist, Cont’d
|
Supportability Risks |
Cost Estimate Risks |
Benefit Estimate Risks |
Schedule Risks |
|
O&M
·83
Inadequate O&M concept
·84
Undeveloped O&M strategy
·85
Specialized O&M equipment
·86
Insufficient maintainability
·87
Unsatisfactory maintenance interfaces
·88
Inadequate maintenance procedures
·89
Undeveloped maintenance plan
·90
Configuration management not enforced
·91
Deficient change process
·92
Logistics
·93
Insufficient spares planning
·94
Spares unavailability
·95
Inaccessible site location
·96
Inadequate training
·97
Unclear Logistics Center responsibilities
Testing and Support
·98
Insufficient support equipment
·99
COTS/NDI - Industry refresh rate not likely to be consistent with FAA needs
·100
Undeveloped support requirements
·101
Inadequate automated test equipment (ATE)
·102
Unidentified field support requirements
·103
Poor diagnostics
·104
Insufficient testing and support facilities
·105
Unskilled/insufficient manpower
Support Documentation
·106
Deficient technical data
·107
Faulty maintenance plan
·108
Undefined data rights
·109
Inappropriate release cycle
System Implementation
·110
Deficient implementation approach
·111
Uncertain transition strategy
·112
Unclear rules and procedures
·113
Insufficient personnel/staffing
·114
Unspecified/inappropriate standards
|
Cost Estimation
·115
Inadequate cost estimating tools
·116
Estimation errors
·117
Inaccurate discount rate
·118
Faulty BOEs**
·119
Insufficient cost margin
·120
Unrealistic overhead and G&A rates
·121
Relies on scarce resources
·122
Speculative life cycle costs
·123
Sensitivity analysis to cost drivers not undertaken
Cost Management
·124
Unsatisfactory cost controls
·125
Insufficient cost monitoring
Product Cost
·126
Undefined government furnished equipment
·127
Reliance on unavailable NDI/COTS
·128
Unavailable government facilities
·129
Unavailable contractor facilities
·130
Inadequate budget for tests
·131
Undefined hardware costs
·132
Hidden software costs
·133
Unidentified parts and materials
|
Benefit Identification
·134
Same benefits claimed by other programs
·135
Unidentified major benefits
·136
Unrealistic identified benefits
·137
Difficult to identify benefits
Benefit Estimation
·138
Benefits not quantifiable
·139
Difficult to estimate benefits
·140
Tenuous relationship to projected benefits
·141
External forces may affect achieving benefits
·142
Erroneous benefits estimations
·143
Inaccurate inflation/discount rates
·144
Speculative cost avoidance
·145
Faulty BOEs. Inadequate estimating tools
|
Schedule Estimation
·146
Inadequate schedule estimating tools
·147
Erroneous estimations
·148
Faulty BOEs
·149
Insufficient schedule margin
·150
Optimistic schedule duration
·151
Inappropriate program schedule
Schedule Dependency
·152
Unpredictable labor strikes
·153
Improper test scheduling
·154
Excessive task concurrency
·155
Unidentified need for procedures development
·156
Unidentified need for regulations development
·157
Inordinate number of critical path items
·158
Unidentified need for standards development
·159
Uncertainties in contractor process
·160
Uncertainties in contractor stability
·161
Schedule too ambitious for degree of technical complexity
·162
Unavailable materials
·163
Unavailable parts
·164
Unavailable government furnished information
·165
Unavailable facilities
·166
Unavailable personnel
·167
Unavailable tools
·168
Unavailable contractor
Schedule Management
·169
Unsatisfactory schedule controls
·170
Insufficient program schedule monitoring
·171
Improper contractor/subcontractor schedule monitoring
|
Table 1: Facet Risk Checklist, Cont’d
|
Management Risks |
Funding Risks |
Stakeholder Risks |
|
Planning
·172
Inadequate program plans
·173
Incomplete contingency plans
·174
Deficient risk management plans
·175
Inadequate management approach
·176
Unplanned slips in other programs
·177
Adverse environmental impacts
·178
Unsubstantiated funding profile
·179
Unsubstantiated manpower requirements
·180
Unidentified personnel skills
·181
Minimal resource alternatives
·182
Excessive dependencies on other system
·183
Unexpected acquisition regulation changes
Organizing
·184
Excessive span of control
·185
Inadequate authority
·186
Undefined responsibilities
·187
Unclear communications
·188
Undefined integration responsibilities
·189
Ambiguous organizational interfaces
·190
Inadequate contractor organization
Implementing
·191
Insufficient management tools
·192
Inadequate program office staffing
·193
Inadequate resource allocation
·194
Deficient personnel management
·195
Lack of coordination
·196
Tenuous top management support
·197
Cumbersome FAA contracting process
·198
Instability of contractor
·199
Uncertainties in procurement
·200
Unavailable personnel
·201
Deficient change implementation
Control
·202
Undefined or ineffective change management
·203
Unsatisfactory configuration management
·204
Insufficient contract evaluation
·205
Inadequate planning for contractor monitoring
·206
Insufficient financial management
·207
Irregular/unscheduled program reviews
·208
Insufficient history/records
·209
Undefined key metrics
·210
Uncontrolled requirements changes
·211
Requirements freeze not enforced
·212
Inadequate tracking systems
|
Funding Constraint
·213
Unfavorable agency priorities
·214
Inadequate funding
·215
Unavailable funding
·216
Lengthy budget cycle
·217
Inadequate OMB marks
·218
Constraining unique budget scoring rules for lease-purchases and leases per OMB A-11
Funding Support
·219
Inadequate user support
·220
Ambiguous operator support
·221
Unclear political support
·222
Marginal cost/benefits
·223
Inconsistent FAA plans
·224
Lack of alignment of necessary funding profile with agency affordability profile
Fiscal Management
·225
Insufficient funding requirements
·226
Insufficient fiscal controls
·227
Insufficient fiscal tools
·228
Insufficient funding plans
|
Congressional Based
·229
Impact of congressional mandates
·230
Unfavorable congressional hearings on program
·231
Critical GAO report
Administration Based
·232
Conflicting FAA priorities
·233
Conflicting DOT priorities
Aviation Community
·234
Many different stakeholders
·235
Diverse user community
·236
Conflicting user demands
·237
Conflicting user opinions
·238
Conflicting user priorities
·239
Inordinate pressure from user groups
·240
Marginal user support
·241
Strained relationships with users
·242
Resistance to avionics equipage requirements
·243
Inordinate media attention
|
Table 1: Facet Risk Checklist, Cont’d
|
Security Risks |
Human Factors Risks |
Safety Risks |
|
Vulnerability
·244
Incomplete vulnerability assessment
·245
Security policy and procedures not in place
·246
Easy access to communication
·247
No provision for firewalls between shared networks or Virtual Private Networks
Threat
·248
Incomplete threat assessment on intent and capability to exploit vulnerability
·249
No prioritization of threat severity
·250
No provision for penetration testing
·251
Threat difficulty not considered
Countermeasures
·252
Few countermeasures defined
·253
Effectiveness of countermeasures on infrastructure not testing
·254
Inadequate configuration audit
·255
Lack of monitoring and enforcement
·256
Insufficient funding tools/controls
·257
Ambiguous funding support
|
Human-in-the-loop Effectiveness
·258
Inadequate definition of human-in-the-loop operational objectives
·259
Inadequate specification of human-in-the-loop benefits
·260
Inadequate analysis of human-in-the-loop system capability to deliver expected benefits or enhancement
·261
Human error mechanisms or metrics not fully identified
·262
Time required to perform tasks is unknown
·263
Automation does not provide the necessary functionality or information to support effective decision-making/problem-solving
Human-in-the-loop Suitability
·264
Lack of consistency, compatibility, or congruity with operational environment or legacy systems
·265
Human-system design/interface induces new/additional human error potential
·266
Inadequate incorporation of functional requirements to support user-system performance goals
User Acceptability
·267
New tasks impose excessive attention, memory, or workload demands
·268
Requires new teaming and communication links
·269
Operations interface is unacceptable to user
·270
Maintenance interface is unacceptable to user
|
Hazards
·271
Hazards and service-level effects not fully identified
·272
Inter-relationship of hazard effects not established
·273
Hazards not classified per common scheme
·274
Hazard class not based on operational environment definition
System Safety Interdependence
·275
Hazard interdependence poorly understood
·276
Interoperability of components on system safety not investigated
·277
Systemic approach to safety is lacking one or more components (planning, requirements, procedures, operation, aircraft certification, or user approval)
Mitigation Strategies
·278
Mitigation strategies not shared
·279
Operational and safety objective not established
·280
Lack of critical/valid safety information
·281
Mitigation strategies not tied to hazards or safety requirements
·282
Plan for development and operational assurance not in place
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